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Economic Liberty as the Basis of Social
Liberty: Bowers Revised in the Context
of State Constitutions
By DANIEL R. GORDON*
Introduction
The death of Lochner v. New York ' in the late 1930s ultimately in-
jured those who opposed Lochner and economic due process. Social
progressives, people who desire to improve the economic and social sta-
tus of those with less power, such as minorities, women, homosexuals,
and the poor, undermined their own cause by choosing not to limit state
power in the early twentieth century. Progressives opposed economic
liberty as obstructing socially progressive legislation benefiting the poor
and powerless in American society.2 Rather than trying to expand fed-
eral constitutional limitations on state power, social progressives ap-
plauded and supported the enhancement of governmental power, both
state and federal. As the twentieth century ends, social progressives suf-
fer from their own unwillingness to tolerate regressive legal doctrines and
policies because Lochner and its strong substantive due process legal phi-
losophy remain unavailable in federal constitutional law to protect a vari-
ety of social and economic behaviors including, homosexuality, abortion,
and panhandling.
Not all is lost for social progressives as they face an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court. If progressives are willing to exploit state
constitutional protections of economic activities, economic liberty re-
mains available as a basis for developing a broad-ranging social liberty.
Part I of this Article reviews how the demise of Lochner doomed the
growth of a strong social liberty protection in federal constitutional law.
Part II investigates how economic liberty is a viable and strong element
of state constitutional law in the late twentieth century. Part III criti-
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., Haverford
College; J.D., Boston College Law School.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See generally Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process,
1987 Wis. L. REv. 265.
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ques three underlying analytical principles utilized by state courts in ap-
plying state constitutional economic liberty. Part IV applies these
underlying analytical principles to homosexuality, a social behavior not
protected by the federal constitution, in order to demonstrate how eco-
nomic liberty principles can be utilized by social progressives to develop
state constitutional social liberties far broader than any federal constitu-
tional privacy protection.
I. The Tragedy of Social Progressivism: The Death of Lochner
For more than half of the decades of the twentieth century, federal
constitutional law developed substantive limits to state power. During
the first three decades of the twentieth century, federal constitutional law
limited the states in regulating private economic activities.3 Lochner pro-
vided the doctrinal and legal bases for placing limits on state govern-
ments when those governments sought to regulate certain private
economic behavior.4 The Lochner Court recognized that the state's po-
lice powers included the protection of safety, health, morals, and general
welfare.5 Those protective interests or purposes of the state govern-
ments, however, were interpreted narrowly. Health meant just that-
health-and could not serve expansively as a rationale for legislation that
really regulated the power to contract.6 Hence, whole areas of human
activity were deemed beyond the control of the basic powers of the states.
Those areas included an employer's ability to require employees to disa-
vow union membership,7 the determination of wage rates,8 the determi-
nation of fees charged for services, 9 and the setting of prices for
products. 10 The federal constitution placed beyond state control a sphere
of conduct involving the right to contract.
This zone of economic liberty ended during the Great Depression
when social legislation became a legitimate exercise of state power."1
Since the mid-1960s, the federal constitution restricted state power
on substantive grounds, to protect a zone of personal privacy and liberty
3. Gabriella S. Tussusov, Note, A Modern Look at Substantive Due Process: Judicial Re-
view of State Economic Regulation Under the New York and Federal Constitutions, 33 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 529, 529-31 (1988).
4. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 57.
7. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
8. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556-58 (1923).
9. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928).
10. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929).
11. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937).
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but not economic liberty. The sphere of protection shifted from the ear-
lier right to contract to the right to obtain and use contraceptives, 12 to
choose to bear a child,13 and to choose to live with an extended family.14
The zone of privacy and liberty cases apply a similar restriction on state
power as do the zone of economic liberty cases. For example, Roe v.
Wade's exclusion of almost all state regulation during the first trimester
of a pregnancy 15 differs little from the ban in Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tals ban on governmental interference in private contracting for wages. 16
Personal and economic liberties carve out areas of human behavior
where government either cannot enter at all, as in the first trimester of
pregnancy, or may enter only for very precise and important reasons.
17
Such liberty protections are among the strongest protections against gov-
ernmental interference because they establish boundaries on governmen-
tal power. Once governmental power is limited, any state interest related
to a specific outcome becomes irrelevant or inconsequential. For in-
stance, though the Roe Court concedes that the state has an interest in
protecting potential life, only at the end of the first trimester does that
interest become meaningful."8 Such a weakening of state interests fails to
occur even in a free-speech context where purely scientific information is
communicated.19 Unfortunately, not only has federal constitutional eco-
nomic liberty disappeared, but the more recently developed federal con-
stitutional social liberty is being weakened20 and may be abandoned.2'
Economic liberty died after a long struggle with social progressiv-
12. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
14. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977).
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
16. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546.
17. See Moore 431 U.S. at 499-500 (the Court utilizes a balancing test and examines the
state's purpose very closely).
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
19. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The
United States government sought to enjoin the publication of a description of the design and
operation of a hydrogen bomb. The description was not a "do-it-yourself" guide to the con-
struction of a thermonuclear device. Id. at 993. The government alleged a threat to national
security, while the Progressive contended no imminent threat existed. Id. at 991-92. The Pro-
gressive case is seen as a potential hindrance to scientists who want to share information about
aspects of nuclear energy. See Mary M. Cheh, The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy
Act: Waking to the Dangers of Government Information Controls, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 163
(1980).
20. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1990); Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510-11 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 195 (1986).
21. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring); Webster, 492 U.S. at 534-35
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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ism.22 The Lochner line of cases blocked a variety of social legislation
aimed at bringing about what could be termed social justice.23 Economic
liberty became a stumbling block, and in some cases a wall, impeding the
creation of more humane conditions by state and federal legislation.
Minimum wage legislation serves as a prime example of how social pro-
gress was thwarted by economic liberty.24 Those who sought to improve
the lot of workers, the poor, and consumers lobbied the state legislatures
and Congress for statutes that offered protection against powerful busi-
ness interests. The Supreme Court embittered those social progressives
by striking down the legislation as violative of economic liberty.25 The
ire of social progressives was heightened during the Great Depression
when the Supreme Court struck down important components of the New
Deal recovery program. 26 The Court finally retreated from economic lib-
erty doctrine in Nebbia v. New York2 7 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish28 by deferring to state legislative determinations for coping with
social and economic problems.
A. The Arguments Opposing Economic Liberty
Opponents of economic liberty offered three arguments why eco-
nomic liberty should cease to defeat social legislation, though the argu-
ments focused indirectly, at best, on the need for social justice and
change. The three arguments are:
(1) By blocking social legislation, the federal courts act beyond
their traditional judicial function by adopting a legislative role.29 Social
issues are not the type of issues that courts are equipped to handle. The
courts lack the representativeness of community values that allow gov-
ernment to cope with social problems.3" In addition, the courts lack the
22. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 360-61 (1985); Ar-
nold M. Paul, Legal Progressivism, the Courts and the Crises of the 1890's, in AMERICAN LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 283-92 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Schieber
eds.); CHARLES WARREN, 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 741-47
(1926).
23. For a statistical analysis of the cases in the early years of the Lochner era, see Warren,
supra note 22, at 714-42.
24. See, e.g., Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927); Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1926), Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925).
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 360-61.
26. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180-
82, 200-08 (1942).
27. 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
28. 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
29. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
30. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 399-400 (1937); Learned Hand, Due Process of
Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REv. 495, 508 (1908).
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competence to play a role in resolving complex economic and social is-
sues.31 Such issues should be debated in legislative committees.32
(2) Economic liberty as a constitutional principle limits the federal
constitution to one economic philosophy: freedom-of-contract, or lais-
sez-faire economics. The constitutionalization of one economic philoso-
phy troubles critics of economic liberty because neither the Due Process
Clause in particular nor the Constitution in general mentions freedom of
contract or freedom to set prices and fees.33 Economic liberty requires
the Supreme Court to read one vision of the nature of American society
into the words "due process."
(3) Economic liberty and the general concept of liberty under the
Due Process Clause undermine the power of the states, especially the
legislatures, to address local concerns or national concerns on a local
basis.34 The states should be free to adopt whatever measures may rea-
sonably be necessary to promote the public welfare.35 Liberty may ob-
struct state powers to such a degree that the nation may want to ask
again whether current notions of liberty have outlived their usefulness
and whether the nation has changed to such an extent since adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment that due process should be reinterpreted.36
The critics argued that economic liberty and notions generally con-
cerning liberty distorted judicial power and constitutional interpretation.
The arguments read as if they were politically neutral, avoiding the es-
pousal of policy results. The integrity of the courts and the federal con-
stitution mattered most. The critics of economic liberty provided a later
generation of constitutional critics with a set of arguments.37
B. The Arguments Opposing Social Liberty
The same arguments that played a role in destroying economic lib-
erty to the benefit of social progressivism now plague social progressives
who support social liberty. Modern conservative critics of social liberty
have developed four arguments why social liberty fails to be a valid con-
stitutional principle. The four arguments echo many of the concerns of
31. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
32. See Hand, supra note 30 at 508.
33. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391.
34. See Charles Warren, The New "Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 431, 464 (1926).
35. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
36. WARREN, supra note 34, at 464-65.
37. See Lino A. Graglia, The Constitution, Community and Liberty, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 291 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Philistinism in Law, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 415 (1989);
William B. Reynolds, Renewing the American Constitutional Heritage, 8 HARV.J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 225 (1985).
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the critics of economic liberty in the first decades of the century. Those
arguments are:
(1) Social liberty distorts the roles of the courts. Legislatures tackle
social issues by making law, and the judiciary has no role to play in de-
veloping social policy. The role of the judicial branch is a reactive one
and not a proactive one.38 When courts override state legislatures on
policy grounds, courts act as if they are legislating. 39 When social policy
issues predominate, the courts possess no more insight into alternative
resolutions than do the legislatures.' The courts must defer to the
legislatures.
(2) Even if the federal constitution fails to reflect majority values, it
should not be applied in ways that flout or impede majority values.41
Social liberty allows the Constitution to be utilized as a shield to political
debate concerning social issues such as abortion, and the construction of
such a shield undermines democratic processes.42 Social liberty reflects a
lack of faith in the self interest of the majority and calls into question the
integrity of representative government.43
(3) Social liberty creates an imbalance in the American system of
federalism. Federal judicial power dominates state power. The Ameri-
can constitutional framework should allow the federal courts to defer to
state law where the states have power and competence. 44 The states con-
stitute legal laboratories, and the federal courts should respect the states'
alternative resolutions to social problems.45 For example, state law pre-
dominates in resolving social issues such as the right to withdraw medi-
cal treatment.46
(4) Social liberty is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the fed-
eral constitution. Failure to restrict liberty to the text of the federal con-
stitution allows social philosophers to read too much into it, which
makes it too amenable to current social remedies.47 Broad reading of
the federal constitution results in highly politicized interpretations that
38. Reynolds, supra note 37, at 226.
39. Richard S. Myers, The End of Substantive Due Process, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 557,
614 (1988).
40. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2841, 2859 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
41. Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986).
42. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
43. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Bowers, 478 U.S. at. 194, 196.
45. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Graglia, supra note 37, at 292; Myers, supra note 39, at 613-14; Reynolds, supra note
37, at 228.
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reflect the value preferences of one segment of American society.48 As a
result, the text of the federal constitution yields to the social preferences
of particular judges.4 9
C. Comparing Economic and Social Liberty
The arguments against social liberty include the same themes as the
arguments against economic liberty. First, constitutionalism blocks the
popular will. Second, the courts do not have the power and competence
to tackle the policy choices at hand, and the courts should yield to the
legislatures, which are empowered and competent to deal with complex
social and economic issues. Last, once judges digress from the text of the
federal constitution into broader principles, individual or collective val-
ues become the law. The modem critics of social liberty emphasize the
individualized distortions of judicial lawmaking, while the earlier critics
of economic liberty emphasized the dangers of incorporating one static
economic theory into constitutional interpretation.
That the modem critics of social liberty utilize arguments similar to
the arguments used against economic liberty should be no surprise. The
modem critics of social liberty aggressively connect the evils of social
liberty with the evils of economic liberty.5" The modem critics remind
social progressives that economic liberty undermined the socially pro-
gressive legislation of the New Deal and that the Supreme Court wisely
repudiated the use of substantive due process as obstructionist."1 The
modem critics also warn that the judicial activism of the first third of the
twentieth century jeopardized programs and legislation supported by so-
cial progressives of another generation.52 These reminders and warnings
serve as a message to modem social progressives: "Be consistent." The
criticisms of substantive due process and liberty in the first third of the
century benefited social progressives. Modem critics of substantive due
process and liberty appeal to modem social progressives' intellectual
honesty. The neutral criticisms of federal judicial power and the role of
the federal constitution espoused by critics to defeat economic liberty
must remain valid, because nothing has changed in the basic framework
of the federal constitution, federal judiciary, and federalism since the
1930s.
48. Reynolds, supra note 37 at 229-30.
49. Graglia, supra note 37, at 294; Myers, supra note 39, at 616.
50. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986); Reynolds, supra note 37, at 230.
51. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
52. Reynolds, supra note 37, at 230.
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When economic liberty disappeared as a strong individual right in
the 1930s, social progressives won a programmatic or political victory,
but they lost strong doctrinal and philosophical bases for the later devel-
opment of social liberty. Social progressivism would be on firmer legal
ground as the twenty-first century approaches if social progressives had
tolerated the existence of economic liberty. Substantive due process in
the 1990s would be celebrating its centennial.5 3 Economic liberty by this
point would be a venerable mainstay of American constitutional law.
The idea that the federal constitution places substantial limits on state
power could serve as an easily expandable doctrinal basis for social lib-
erty. Instead, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 4 defined a special
and narrow zone of familial liberty derived from Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters5 and Meyer v. Nebraska.6 Griswold failed to provide a general con-
stitutional philosophy of limitation of state power. Economic liberty
would have provided social progressives with a broader base from which
to expand individual rights.
It is difficult to state what would have occurred if Lochner and its
progeny had remained valid and strong constitutional law. Some evi-
dence exists. Changes in the mid-twentieth century indicate how social
progressives could have utilized economic liberty to create and nurture
social liberty. Changes in the American social structure encouraged
changes in federal constitutional law. Specifically, the racist caste system
of segregation began to fall into disfavor, especially during World War
II.s7 A shift toward racial desegregation existed during the middle de-
cades of this century. 8 The nexus between social change and constitu-
tional law occurred in Brown v. Board of Education,"9 in which the
United States Supreme Court ordered local officials acting under the
color of state law to enforce social interaction between black and white
students." Brown began the social-constitutional revolution of the last
thirty or so years in which the federal courts sought to create changes in
American society.6'
53. The precursor to Lochner was Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
54. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
55. 268 U.S. 510, 514 (1925).
56. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
57. CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF
SOUTHERN TRANSIT 37-44 (1983).
58. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and Black America's Struggle for Equality (1975).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Id. at 495.
61. See Posner, supra note 37, at 418-19; Reynolds, supra note 37, at 231-32.
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If economic liberty had existed during the past thirty years as social
change pressured the federal legal system into creating further legal and
social change, the federal courts would have been confronted with a
problem of logic. How could the Supreme Court justify the existence of
liberty that protected economic activity without also providing liberty
that protected social activity? The Court would have been placed in the
position of prioritizing economic values over social values in a social and
legal climate in which social values were increasingly more important.
Social progressives could have easily required the Court to face this in-
consistency in the nature of due process liberty. In fact, Brown provides
a good example of how social liberty could have served as a sturdier
doctrinal basis for the end of segregation. The Brown Court experienced
problems in finding a doctrinal basis for applying the Equal Protection
Clause because the intent of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
was difficult to understand. Public education existed in only a rudimen-
tary form in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.62 The
Brown Court analyzed inequality under equal protection by finding
psycho-social injury to children in segregated black schools, and that
finding explained only why school segregation violated equal protection
even when educational facilities were arguably equal though definitely
separate.63
Applying economic liberty analysis to school segregation could have
delivered a surer message to segregationist state officials. A basic compo-
nent of economic liberty involved testing the legitimacy of state power.
If the ends to be achieved by a state were outside the police powers legiti-
mately allowed the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, liberty existed.
The legitimate powers included protecting the safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of the people." Two analyses helped determine whether
state purposes fit within legitimate state powers. First, the court deter-
mined the actual goal of a state statute. That actual goal was closely
analyzed to ensure that it fit into one of the legitimate state powers,
which were defined narrowly. The claim that a state statutory goal fit
within a legitimate state power could not be pretextual.65 Second, the
court deemed certain human activities to be protected by economic lib-
erty. The Supreme Court utilized a traditionalist-historical approach to
determining what activities were so protected. For instance, the right to
make a living was traceable to the concept of the pursuit of happiness in
62. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
63. Id. at 494.
64. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
65. Id. at 56.
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the Declaration of Independence.66 Economic liberty included an ina-
lienable right to pursue an occupation. As a result of this analysis, cer-
tain economic activity constitutionally was categorized beyond the state
power to prohibit and regulate. The federal constitution reflected the
history and culture of the American nation, and the history and culture
became intertwined with the liberties protected by the federal
constitution.
Both analyses for determining whether state purposes fit within state
powers are applicable to Brown, though the context transcends econom-
ics. First, the segregationist state officials probably would allege a
number of legitimate goals such as keeping order67 and preserving the
moral beliefs of the majority.68 Due process requires that these goals be
scrutinized carefully, and a close scrutiny of segregationist laws would
allow social progressives to focus judicial attention directly on the racist
and biased rationales for the segregation statutes.69 The goal of separat-
ing the races because one race considers itself superior falls farther
outside the protection of health, safety, morals, and general welfare than
restricting the hours of employment. The proponents of restricting hours
of employment argued that the restrictions were legitimate public health
measures, but the Supreme Court found that the restrictions were labor
measures outside the police power.70 The Brown Court could easily have
found that the segregation statutes were social stratification measures
outside the morals-protection and public safety powers of the states.
Next, social progressives could have argued that the individual right to
choose among available state services and obtain an education free of
racial distinctions was a traditional liberty included in due process. In
evaluating such an argument, the Brown Court need not have concerned
itself with the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in
relation to public schools.71 Instead, the Court could have focused more
directly on the context of the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments as the result of the Civil War, much as the Court
had focused on the nature of the American economic system when the
Court reviewed economic regulations.7" The Civil War and the constitu-
66. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (citing Butchers' Union Slaughter-
House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884)).
67. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1958) (decided in the context of violence
created by attempts to desegregate the Little Rock schools).
68. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
70. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54-58.
71. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
72. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897).
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tional amendments that followed, instilled in the Constitution an antipa-
thy to regulating people and their activities on the basis of race73 or of
other social distinctions.74 The right of the individual to relate freely to
others, including public officials, unhampered by legal restrictions based
on race, was secure.
Social progressives needed to view the detriments of Lochner and
economic liberty as narrow and not very consequential. Nebbia v. New
York 75 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish76 appear to save the United
States of the late 1930s from the continued restrictions of Lochner. Loch-
ner and economic liberty were perceived as threatening the New Deal
efforts to bring the United States out of the Great Depression.77 Two
problems arise from this view of economic liberty indicating some polit-
ical bias and historical distortion. On the one hand, Lochner and eco-
nomic liberty would have been only partially disruptive of federal
governmental action to improve the social welfare of those suffering from
economic dislocation. On the other, governmental efforts to overcome
the impacts of the Depression have been overstated and economic liberty
could not have hampered recovery in a decisive fashion.
Economic liberty certainly hampered some of the New Deal efforts
to revive the American economy in the early 1930s. 71 A distinction must
be made, however, between the types of efforts attempted by the New
Deal. First, the federal government attempted to regulate segments of
the economy79 or the relationship between workers and their employ-
ers." Economic liberty undermined those types of regulatory efforts.
81
But such regulation was only one aspect of the federal government's ef-
forts to eradicate widespread poverty and unemployment. The redistri-
bution of monies to those in need was an equally important component of
73. See BARNES, supra note 57, at 24-51.
74. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
75. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
76. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
77. See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhu-
mation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34, 40-45; Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 643, 653-74 (1946); Frank R.
Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15
ARZ. L. REv. 419, 447-55 (1973).
78. See, eg., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935); Rail-
road Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).
79. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
80. Bituminous Coal Act, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935) (repealed 1937).
81. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550.
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the New Deal. 2 Economic liberty would not have prevented economic
redistribution and the rise of the welfare state. 
3
The distinction between the regulatory state, proscribed by eco-
nomic liberty, and the welfare state, unhindered by economic liberty, ap-
peared vividly in United States v. Butler, 4 in which the Supreme Court
invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.85 Under the agri-
cultural adjustment scheme, the federal government sought to raise farm
prices by contracting with farmers to reduce their farming acreage in
returm for benefit payments.8 6 The Court struck down the scheme, not
because Congress was spending tax monies to help farmers or to further
the general welfare, but because the act authorized the expenditure of
federal funds to regulate and control agricultural production. 7 The fed-
eral government possesses the authority to tax and spend for a wide vari-
ety of purposes,"8 but it lacks the authority to control agriculture, which
the states may regulate and control.8 9 Regulation would be hampered by
economic liberty, but welfare programs and social insurance, such as So-
cial Security, that avoid regulating or controlling economic activity were
valid and acceptable under economic liberty.90
Another example of the distinction between the regulatory state and
the welfare state is the contrast between minimum wage legislation and
unemployment insurance. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,9" the
Supreme Court struck down a federal statute that required employers in
the District of Columbia to pay a minimum wage to women and chil-
dren.92 The statutory scheme was regulatory in nature. First, a three-
member board investigated wage conditions and established minimum
wages for different groups of employers.93 Second, employers were re-
quired under the statute to comply with minimum wage laws approved
by the board. Any violations by employers could result in a misde-
meanor conviction, punishable by fine and imprisonment. 94 The mini-
mum wage statute controlled private behavior, that of employers.
82. See, e.g., Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sections 301-306 (1988)).
83. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).
84. 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
85. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
86. Butler, 297 U.S. at 54-55.
87. Id. at 68.
88. Id. at 65-67.
89. Id. at 68.
90. See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644-45.
91. 261 U.S. 525, 553-57 (1923).
92. Act of Sept. 19, 1918, ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960.
93. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 540-41.
94. Id. at 541.
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Though the impositions on employers resulted in some redistribution of
wealth between employer and employee, the gist of the statutory scheme
involved control over private economic decisions through threats of pu-
nitive coercion. The Court conceived of the minimum wage as a price-
fixing law9" establishing the prices of labor in contravention of the liberty
to contract.
96
The unemployment insurance program challenged in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, stands in contrast to the minimum wage schemes
in Adkins.97 In Steward, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act.98 Under
the statute, specified employers paid an excise tax based on total wages
payable by the employers.99 Tax receipts collected by the Secretary of
the Treasury would be distributed to state unemployment compensation
offices." 0 The unemployment insurance scheme serves as a redistributive
method benefiting the unemployed at the expense of those who pay the
tax. The program lacks the coercive components aimed at changing pri-
vate conduct as found in the minimum wage context. Employers would
have to pay the tax under a wide variety of circumstances, and employer
behavior might only be indirectly affected by the tax. Possibly employers
would want to avoid laying off employees to insure that contributions
would be lower in the future. That result, however, is not the intent of
the insurance program, and probably many employers would have to act
in concert to prevent increases in unemployment expenditures. The
Court analyzed the unemployment insurance program by reviewing the
constitutional and traditional taxing powers of Congress 0 1 and govern-
ment generally.102 Congressional taxing power is comprehensive10 3 as is
the power to appropriate public monies."°4 The power of American gov-
ernment to redistribute wealth through taxation and expenditure is com-
prehensive, and government may spend tax monies to ameliorate
economic crises. 105
Whether viewing the regulatory or the welfare-redistribution aspects
95. Id. at 554.
96. Id. at 553.
97. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
98. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sections
301-306 (1988)).
99. See 301 U.S. at 574.
100. Id. at 576.
101. Id. at 581.
102. Id. at 579-80.
103. Id. at 581.
104. Id. at 585.
105. Id. at 586-87.
1022 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:1009
of the New Deal,1"6 observers question its efficacy. At best, the New
Deal brought about a partial recovery. 10 7 Unemployment remained
stubbornly high throughout the Depression Years.108 The New Deal
failed to produce any far-reaching structural changes in the American
economic system.109 What really changed the American economy, by
creating an economic recovery, was the Second World War.110 The
weakness of the New Deal as a policy and a political institutional process
indicates that social liberty played a small role in deterring economic and
social progress in the 1930s. Certainly, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States1 1' serves as a visible roadblock in the way of progress, but the
underlying dynamics of the NIRA probably did far more to destroy itself
than did Schechter.'12
Social progressives, fearful of turning their backs on the governmen-
tal interventionism of the New Deal, are faced with an intellectual
choice. Social progressives may have to make a tradeoff between the reg-
ulatory aspects of governmental interventionism on behalf of the power-
less in American society and the creation of a zone of social
noninterference protecting the powerless against these same govern-
ments, both federal and state. The tradeoff seems to be an imbalanced
one and should be easy to make. Even if the regulatory state is hampered
by the rejuvenation of economic liberty transformed into social liberty,
the welfare state should continue. The sacrifice of the regulatory state
involves modest losses, because the archetypal regulatory state, the New
Deal, looms as a modest success, if that.
The development of social liberty based on the doctrines and analy-
ses of economic liberty would have provided those dedicated to securing
the rights of the powerless in American society a constitutional method
to limit state prohibitions and restrictions on social intercourse and pri-
vate decisionmaking. Unfortunately, the demise of federal constitutional
economic liberty ended any hope for creating a broad federal constitu-
tional social liberty. Even in the 1990s, however, social progressives have
an opportunity to fashion constitutional social liberty based on constitu-
tional economic liberty. History can be retraced and transformed.
106. The New Deal involved a hodgepodge of regulatory and redistribution programs.
JAMES M. BURNS, THE CROSSWINDs FREEDOM 214-15 (1989).
107. Id. at 128.
108. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 393 (1980).
109. BURNS, supra note 106, at 128.
110. ZINN, supra note 108, at 393; BURNS, supra note 106, at 215.
111. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
112. ZINN, supra note 108, at 383.
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II. The Remaining Basis for Social Liberty: Social
Progressives Obtain a Second Opportunity to
Appreciate Economic Liberty
As the twenty-first century approaches, constitutional economic lib-
erty remains a viable and strong element of state constitutional law. So-
cial progressives still possess the opportunity to exploit economic liberty
to strengthen individual rights by urging the courts to recognize social
liberty. They have a second chance to utilize economic liberty instead of
criticizing and destroying it.
Since the demise of federal constitutional economic liberty in the
late 1930s, state constitutions have protected a variety of economic activ-
ities from state prohibitions and regulations.113 Among the economic ac-
tivities protected are commission negotiations by insurance agents," 4
construction of a medical facility without a certificate of need," 5 direct
business solicitation by public insurance adjusters, 1 6 advertisement of
the names and prices of prescription drugs,1 7 retail gasoline pricing,"'
street vending," 9  ticket scalping,'20  liquor pricing,' and milk
pricing.
122
The state courts derive economic liberty from state constitutional
due process clauses 123 that protect against the deprivation of life, liberty,
113. See John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1958).
114. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
App. 1984), affid, 492 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1986).
115. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 1973). See
also Joshua A. Newberg, In Defense of Aston Park- The Case for State Substantive Due Process
Review of Health Care Regulation, 68 N.C. L. REv. 253 (1990). But see Mount Royal Towers
v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1980).
116. Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1958).
117. Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962). See also Florida Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969).
118. Alabama Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1942). See also
Alabama ex rel Galanos v. Mapco Petroleum, Inc., 519 So. 2d 1275 (Ala. 1987).
119. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1943). See Gabriella
S. Tussuson, Note, A Modern Look at Substantive Due Process: Judicial Review of State Eco-
nomic Regulation Under the New York and Federal Constitutions, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
529 (1988).
120. Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1973).
121. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
122. Gillette Dairy v. Nebraska Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214 (Neb. 1974); Harris v.
Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. 1951).
123. See, eg., Murphy v. Quinn, 402 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 1981) (Florida Supreme Court
applied FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9); Gillette Dairy, 219 N.W.2d at 220 (Nebraska Supreme Court
used NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3).
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or property "but by the law of the land,"' 24 and state constitutional
clauses that protect the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.125 Some of the courts also refer to due process under the
federal constitution at the same time they cite to their own state constitu-
tions.1 26 The state courts develop their law of economic liberty both in-
dependent of and dependent on the older and outmoded federal
constitutional economic liberty analysis represented by Lochner and de-
valued by Nebbia v. New York. 27 The Georgia Supreme Court in Harris
v. Duncan relied on the dissent in Nebbia by Justice McReynolds to ana-
lyze how the milk industry is not affected with the public interest and
therefore not subject to state price controls.128 Some of the state cases
129
rely on the federal constitutional law "affected with a public interest"
test.' 30 However, to develop economic liberty the state courts also rely
on their own state constitutionally based thinking about due process and
liberty. Even in Duncan, Chief Justice Duckworth, in his concurrence,
notes that the invocation of the Georgia Due Process Clause by a litigant
requires a decision based on the Georgia Constitution unhampered by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning federal due
process. 131 Also, state economic liberty can arise primarily from state
constitutional law and analyses. 132 Though federal constitutional law is
mentioned, federal constitutional law serves only to aid the state court in
its thinking and is neither binding nor determinative.
33
Whether relying on older federal constitutional economic liberty
principles or their own state constitutional due process principles, the
state courts, using their own state constitutions, have developed a general
standard of protection for economic activity. That standard is based on a
124. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 193 S.E.2d 729, 734-35 (North Caro-
lina Supreme Court used N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 19).
125. Estell, 286 So. 2d at 875 (Alabama Supreme Court relied on ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1,
35).
126. See, e.g., Good Humor, 49 N.E.2d at 155.
127. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
128. Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ga. 1951).
129. See, e.g., Estell, 286 So. 2d at 874; Alabama Indep. Serv. Station, 6 So. 2d at 506. But
see Mount Royal Towers, Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Ala. 1980).
130. See Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kansas. 262 U.S. 522 (1923)
(Court recognized that some businesses were imbued with a public interest and subject to state
regulation).
131. Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 1951)(Duckworth, J., concurring).
132. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495, 497
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
133. Id. at 497-98 (court refers to First Amendment commercial speech cases to demon-
strate why the public need not be protected from low cost, low quality services by restrictive
state regulations).
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means-ends analysis. 134 The courts identify the ends or goals of a state
statute or regulation and determine whether those ends or goals are legit-
imate. Next, the courts review whether the means provided by the stat-
ute or regulation fulfill those ends or goals of the statute. On the ends
side of the analysis, the statute or regulation must meet general tests.
Legislation must reasonably and substantially promote the public health,
safety, or welfare, and must reasonably relate to a legitimate state interest
that protects the public. 135 On the "means" side of the analysis, the
courts examine the relationship between the purpose of the statute and
the operation of the statute. The courts require that a legitimate bona
fide relationship exist between a permissible public purpose and the legis-
lation that furthers that purpose. 136 A legislature may not impose unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, or confiscatory conditions.
137
Economic liberty exists in the late twentieth century in state consti-
tutional law. Social progressives possess the opportunity to expand eco-
nomic liberty in order to fashion social liberty. What aids social
progressives in that task are the economic liberty analyses utilized by the
state courts in protecting economic activity.
M. Gems to Be Minded: Economic Liberty Analyses
State courts utilize three analytical principles in applying economic
liberty. 3 ' At least one of these principles appears in each economic lib-
erty case, and often all three appear. These three principles are: defining
the limits of state governmental power, utilizing an in-depth review of
state regulation, and remaining suspicious of state regulations that bene-
fit the few instead of the whole polity.
A. Recognizing the Limits of Power
State courts recognize limits to state power to regulate economic
activity. The courts focus heavily on the ends component of the means-
ends legal standard. Unlike modem federal substantive due process cases
involving economic regulations, 39 the state cases avoid being deferential
134. See, eg., Alabama ex reL Galanos v. Mapco Petroleum, Inc. 519 So. 2d 175, 1284
(Ala. 1987).
135. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 457 So. 2d at 497; Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.
2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1958).
136. Mount Royal Towers, Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Ala.
1980).
137. Gillette Dairy, Ina v. Nebrsaka Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Neb. 1974).
138. See Daniel R. Gordon, Progressives Retreat: Falling Back from the Federal Constitu-
tion to the State Constitutions, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 801, 817-18 (1991).
139. See, eg., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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to the state interests or purposes furthered by a statute or regulation.
State power lacks flexibility and elasticity. Two methods of defining and
limiting state power prevail. Either the state courts focus on defining the
legitimate ends or goals of state regulation-and, therefore, state
power-or the courts recognize certain human behavior as either beyond
regulation or regulated only in those few circumstances where a very
strong state purpose exists.
1. Defining Legitimate Ends
Statutes must reasonably and substantially promote the public
health, safety, and welfare."4 The use of the words "public health,
safety, or welfare" to describe legitimate goals or purposes of state stat-
utes is neither ritualistic nor talismanic. The state courts ascribe a vari-
ety of meanings to these terms. Some meanings are vague and others
clearly defined. The outer limit of state power occurs when a statute fails
in any way to promote the people's health, safety, or welfare.14 1 Even
though such a limit on state power may appear deferential, that limit
does acknowledge a point past which the state possesses no power. The
cases tend to narrow state power as a concept. For example, statutes
must remedy actual problems that exist. In Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Ne-
braska Dairy Products Board, the court concedes that a statute could re-
quire a milk distributor to sell above its actual cost in order to prevent
price undercutting that drives competitors out of business. 42 In con-
trast, the court found that a statute could not require milk distributors to
sell above an industry average cost far above distributors' actual costs,
because such a requirement not only fails to remedy unfair competition
but tends to create industry inefficiency. 43 Hence, the state has the
power to remedy only observable and tangible problems.
Not only should legislation tackle observable and tangible problems,
but a balance must exist between the degree of burden legislation im-
poses, the importance of the right infringed, and the gravity of those ob-
servable and tangible problems with which legislation deals. 1" The state
has limited power to create a high degree of burden when a right is im-
portant and the actual conditions are not grave. The police power is
140. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495, 497
(Fla. App. 1984).
141. Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d 1032,
1034 (Fla. 1986).
142. 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 1974).
143. See id. at 220-21.
144. Mount Royal Towers Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1215 (Ala.
1980).
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restricted to those issues that by necessity affect the public welfare.145
Not every issue addressed by the legislature is one of necessity or affects
the public welfare. Some issues are only personal or only involve a small
class of people instead of the general public. 1I
Themes of realism and practicality permeate the cases. Power exists
to tackle concrete and widespread community problems. It serves the
good of the community, and the community must experience tangible
benefits before the community allows legal restrictions and regulations to
burden it. The specific powers that the state courts recognize as beyond
the police powers are good examples of this theme. States possess no
power to curb bargaining,147 to assist medical care facilities in maintain-
ing high bed capacities, 148 to discourage competition,' 49 or to create mo-
nopolies.150 These limitations on state power imply certain positive
community values favored and protected by the state courts. For in-
stance, the community benefits from a free-market economy that fosters
competition.151 State power exists to further these values rather than un-
dermine them. When people are acting under the positive influence of
these values, the state possesses no power to regulate them.
2. Recognizing Human Behavior That Is Beyond State Control
A second means of analyzing the limits of state power focuses on the
limits of power, but instead deems some human behaviors beyond state
regulation. Such an approach is a more positive one. Rather than defin-
ing what the state lacks power to do, attention focuses on what people
may do without governmental restraints. People have the liberty to pur-
sue certain activity without state interference. First, people may do what
is lawful, such as sell ice cream on a street corner, without interfer-
ence.'52 The definition of "lawful" is unclear, but must mean something
other than that the legislature has deemed certain activity lawless under
the challenged statute. Otherwise, no statute would be protected under
economic liberty, which would be controlled solely by legislative deter-
mination. Instead, "lawful" means activity that is recognized and regu-
lated as legitimate behavior by statutes generally though still in violation
145. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949).
146. Id.
147. Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So.2d 1032,
1033 (Fla. 1986).
148. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 193 S.E.2d 729, 734 (N.C. 1973).
149. Alabama Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1942).
150. Aston Park Hosp., 193 S.E.2d at 734.
151. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495, 497
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
152. Good Humor Corp.v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. 1943).
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of the challenged statute.153 Even that definition allows the legislature to
contour the limits of economic liberty to some degree.
The courts venture beyond a legislative definition of what is lawful
activity that the states may not prohibit. Liberty exists to pursue a useful
and harmless occupation such as selling gasoline at a discount. 154 An
activity is lawful if it is common, traditional, and conducted in a manner
that does not annoy people or impede other lawful activity, such as using
the public streets. 155 Certain human behavior, such as selling useful
products, is generally accepted because no one is hurt and people may
even benefit. Recognizing that states should avoid interfering with such
behavior, the courts maintain a zone of governmental non-interference.
The recognition of boundaries on state power means that the actions
of state legislatures are always open to questions of legitimacy. State leg-
islatures may possess inherent police power in the American system of
government and law-making, 56 but that power has limits. Not only do
the state courts define the limits of power when they apply economic
liberty, but they also review state statutes and regulations very closely.
B. The Nature of Judicial Review
State courts refuse to accord deference to state legislatures when
those legislatures enact statutes regulating economic activities and behav-
ior. Courts rarely characterize their scrutiny of economic legislation,
and that scrutiny is not the heightened scrutiny utilized by the federal
courts in equal protection cases. 157 At least one court, however, refers to
its own and other state courts' scrutiny of economic regulations as "more
rigorous" than that of the federal courts. 58 The courts avoid accepting
at face value the purposes of legislation and the state interests asserted by
the state or parties seeking to enforce economic legislation.' 59 Courts
review whether legislative findings are reasonable and valid."6 Overall,
courts scrutinize the result and impact of legislation on economic behav-
ior to gauge whether that legislation fits within the state's police pow-
153. Id.
154. Alabama Indep. Serv. Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 6 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1942).
155. Good Humor, 49 N.E.2d at 155.
156. See Client Follow-up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ill. 1979); Kansas ex rel
Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978).
157. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
158. Mount Royal Towers, Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Ala.
1908).
159. See, ag., Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d
495,497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Stadnik v. Shell City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962).
160. Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ga. 1951).
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ers. 16 1 Often, courts perform non-empirical analyses of social behavior
and the impact of legislation on that behavior.
162
In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital163 provides a good
example of how a state court critically reviews economic legislation. The
Aston Park court reviewed a statute that required medical care facilities
to obtain a certificate of need before constructing or adding patient-care
bed capacity."6 A private hospital proposed to construct a 200-bed facil-
ity in place of its existing 50-bed facility, but the North Carolina Medical
Care Commission denied the hospital's application for a certificate of
need.165 The Medical Care Commission argued that the certificate of
need requirement served three state interests or purposes relating to the
protection of public health. First, certificates of need prevented limited
medical staffing resources from being spread too thin by excess hospital
bed capacity, thereby endangering patient care. Second, concentrated
bed capacity assured more efficient use of physician time. Third, excess
bed capacity would require that the overhead cost of vacant beds be
charged to patients who utilize beds, raising the costs of hospital care to
patients.' 66 Overall, the Medical Care Commission asserted that the
quality of patient care services was intertwined with controlling the cost
of medical services, and controlling medical care facility construction
played an important role in controlling costs and quality.
The Aston Park court disregarded much of the Medical Care Com-
mission's arguments about how certificates of need protect quality health
services. The court agreed that the state possessed a strong interest in
assuring that hospital construction was adequate in design, structure,
and equipment for patient care purposes. 16 7 The court, however, found
that the certificate-of-need legislation failed to further such purposes de-
spite the assertions of the Medical Care Commission to the contrary.
The court viewed the statute as having the narrow purpose of keeping
established and existing hospital beds occupied for the economic good of
established and existing medical care facilities.' 68 The court, utilizing
what it characterized as common knowledge, disputed the Medical Care
Commission's arguments that excess bed capacity increases hospital
costs. According to the court, common knowledge indicated that costs
161. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949).
162. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 457 So. 2d at 498.
163. 193 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 1979).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-289, 291 (1971)(repealed 1973).
165. 193 S.E.2d at 730.
166. Id. at 734.
167. Id. at 733.
168. Id. at 734.
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rose when patients were unable to obtain promptly vacant hospital
rooms. The court concluded that the true purpose of the statute was not
health care cost-protection, but rather, the creation of healthcare monop-
olies among existing facilities. The court proceeded to find that competi-
tion would serve the purpose of controlling health care costs better than
restrictive certificates of need would. 16 9
Deference to state legislatures does not constrain state courts from
applying economic liberty. Though the courts avoid identifying a height-
ened scrutiny, the courts utilize an in-depth analytical approach to test-
ing the purposes and interests served by economic regulations. Courts do
not accept at face value state assertions concerning the purposes and in-
terests furthered. Instead, courts aggressively observe human behavior
and economic processes and test whether statutes actually further under-
standable and rational state interests.
C. Requiring That Statutes Serve the Many and Not the Few
State courts react negatively to economic regulation that either pre-
fers the interest of one group over those of another or prefers the interest
of one group over those of the general public. Economic liberty requires
that sovereign power never be granted in favor of one segment of the
population to the detriment of another group unless the general welfare
is served. 7° To justify economic regulation, a state must demonstrate
how the legislation benefits the general public as opposed to a particular
class. 17 1 The state courts guard against narrow domination of legal regu-
lation by small groups because those courts are concerned about manu-
facturing monopolies. For example, a few large liquor companies could
use statutory law to maintain their dominant position. 172 The focus of
attention becomes the purpose of law in a constitutionally based legal
system. Law serves the public generally and the public welfare domi-
nates the application of law. The public welfare opposes state subordina-
tion of the rights of one group to advance the welfare of another
group. 173 Law is neutral and, in a constitutional framework, no entity
has the right to capture the state power for its own narrow interests.
The courts imply a sensitivity to the realities of the relationship between
169. Id.
170. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.,40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949); De-
partment of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla.
1986).
171. Aston Park Hosp., 193 S.E.2d at 735 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1893)).
172. Liquor Store, Inc., 40 So. 2d at 375-76.
173. Id. at 374.
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law and political power. One of the newer cases addressed the relation-
ship between law and politics in the context of economic interest groups
and pressure groups seeking the passage of legislation for their own nar-
row purposes. 174 Statutes are not automatically accorded popular legiti-
macy because they are enacted by the people's representatives; too often,
small and powerful lobbies or even large and powerful lobbies will domi-
nate what should be an open and public process of lawmaking. Lawmak-
ing and law can be captured by the few, and the public is not served.
Economic liberty protects the public from powerful economic forces that
can distort lawmaking and law for their own purposes.
IV. Revisiting Gay Freedom and Bowers in the Context of
Economic Liberty Analyses
Bowers v. Hardwick upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized sod-
omy.1 75 The statute provided that anyone convicted of the sex acts in-
volved in sodomy would be punished by imprisonment from anywhere
between one and twenty years. 176 Georgia police arrested a gay man
while he was engaging in sodomy with an adult in the bedroom of the
arrestee's home.1 77 The gay defendant never had the opportunity to ap-
ply the analytical components of economic due process under the Geor-
gia Constitution.1 78 Harris v. Duncan 179 would have provided him with
the opportunity to apply the range of economic liberty analyses (outlined
in Part III of this Article) to his social liberty issue.
Superimposing economic liberty analyses on a social liberty problem
or issue leads to a different result from that reached by the Bowers Court,
which reviewed the Georgia statute in the light of federal constitutional
privacy law.1 80
A. Injurious Impact
Economic liberty requires that in order for a state to regulate human
behavior, that behavior must have an actual, identifiable injurious impact
174. Mount Royal Towers Inc. v. Alabama Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Ala.
1980).
175. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Gordon, supra note 138, at 718.
176. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
177. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
178. The district attorney never presented the charges to a grand jury, and the arrestee
brought suit in Federal District Court to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under
the federal constitution. Id. at 186.
179. 67 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. 1951).
180. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
1032 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:1009
on society181 or must not be viewed as lawful or generally accepted in
society.18 2 Homosexual conduct may not be viewed generally as widely
accepted lawful activity,183 but the state will be hard-pressed to prove
that sodomy has an actual injurious impact on society. Personal activity
that occurs solely within the confines of an individual's residence most
often has limited impact beyond the parties involved. 84 Private adult
sexual activity in the confines of a bedroom, or the kitchen for that mat-
ter, does not have the societal or moral impact of a murder in that same
bedroom or kitchen. 85 The impact on the community determines the
actual injurious impact of a private, adult, consensual sexual act on soci-
ety. The public nature of the act must be analyzed, but not in the sense
of analyzing only the location of the act. The social impact must be
broader. This analysis is similar to that of the state courts in viewing the
broader monopolistic impact of price-fixing statutes.1 86 A private sexual
act that arises from a commercial circumstance in which prostitutes util-
ize a public park to attract customers has serious public impact that may
justify the use of state power. 187 Not only may such behavior negatively
impact the use of a public facility, but it may also encourage people to
view sexuality as a commodity as opposed to intimate, personal self-ful-
fillment. 8 8 The Georgia sodomy statute blurs the distinction between
private, consensual, personal activity and truly injurious public-impact
conduct. That statute applies even when no identifiable public harm ex-
ists, such as when sodomy occurs in a private residence between two
consenting adults. The economic liberty requirement of actual public
harm translates into a greater sensitivity to the distinction between pri-
vate personal acts and publicly felt behavior. That distinction creates
one of the bases for social liberty.
B. State Interests
Economic liberty requires in-depth judicial review of the purposes
and state interests to be fulfilled by legislation. Courts will not accept
asserted state interests at face value, and will deem some such interests
insufficient to justify the application of state power to a problem. Over-
181. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
183. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
184. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504, 511
(Alaska 1975).
185. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. See Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
187. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 113-14 (Minn. 1987); Gordon v. State, 360 S.E.2d
253 (Ga. 1987).
188. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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all, the courts refuse to allow the state to assert pretextual rationaliza-
tions for state utilization of its power. 189 In a sense, economic liberty
analysis pierces the legislative veil190 of asserted state interests and pur-
poses. Applying this analysis to an anti-sodomy statute such as the one
in Bowers would probably involve testing state interests concerning
health, safety, and morality. In fact, the Bowers case never focused on
the state interests to be furthered by the Georgia statute. The Eleventh
Circuit remanded to the trial court the issue whether the state had a
compelling interest in regulating private, consensual, adult sodomy. 91
The United States Supreme Court found no fundamental right of privacy
encompassing homosexual relations against which state interests would
be weighed.192
We can surmise what the asserted state purposes and interests in-
volving an anti-sodomy statute would be. Health and safety issues would
probably predominate. Sodomy may play a role in the spread of diseases
such as AIDS. Minors must be protected from the corruption of homo-
sexual sex.193 The ready availability of sodomy may lead to the commer-
cial sale of sex in public locations such as parks.194 Piercing the veil of
state interests requires that asserted state purposes and interests be scru-
tinized in depth. For instance, none of these purposes or interests justify
criminalizing private, consensual, adult sexual behavior unrelated to the
commercial sale of sex. The health concerns are overstated because
AIDS can be spread by a number of sexual and nonsexual means includ-
ing blood transfusions, and can be prevented by using a condom.19 5 No
reason exists for the state to outlaw one way of spreading a disease when
a number of other ways remain legitimate, lawful behavior. Piercing the
veil of state interests regarding an anti-sodomy statute that prohibits sex-
ual intimacy between two consenting adults in a noncommercial, private
context probably will lead to the true interest served by such statutes;
furthering public morality. Certainly, the Supreme Court recognized the
moral overtones involving anti-sodomy statutes when it explained in
Bowers why a rational basis for the statute existed.1 96 The problem with
morality being the purpose of a statute restricting social relations and
189. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
190. See, eg., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 13 (N.Y. 1966) (court uses piercing of
the veil in its traditional corporate context to determine whether a corporate entity should be
disregarded as a sham).
191. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212-13 (1lth Cir. 1985).
192. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
193. See Ray v. State, 389 S.E.2d 326, 328 (Ga. 1990).
194. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 113-14 (Minn. 1987).
195. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
196. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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liberty is that special or selected social groups are served at the expense
of other groups, which undermines another analytical premise of eco-
nomic liberty.
C. Serving the Few
Economic liberty discourages state regulation that serves the inter-
ests of one segment of society to the detriment of another segment of
society. 197 If morality serves as the true underlying purpose of an anti-
sodomy statute, 198 one segment of society benefits to the detriment of
another. Those who are homophobic, or at least oppose homosexual be-
havior, have utilized the legislature to prevent sexual behavior that they
believe is illegitimate. State power then reflects limited moral interests.
By choosing between competing private values instead of maximizing
public values, the legislature violates principles of economic liberty. In
the context of sexual behavior, the private values preferred are moral
ones. 199 Anti-sodomy statutes reflect particularly narrow private-institu-
tional moral interests. Statutes regulating sexual behavior in general
originate from religious attitudes,2" and anti-sodomy legislation in par-
ticular originates from theology.2" 1 Religious institutions, their follow-
ers, and those who sympathize with them utilize the legislature to
criminalize behavior that runs contrary to their private moral beliefs con-
cerning private, consensual, adult sex. Gay men who aspire to experi-
ence sexual intimacy suffer from this unidimensional usurpation of
legislative police powers. Anti-sodomy statutes create a type of moral
monopoly much like the economic monopolies created by price-fixing
statutes.
Conclusion: Social Liberty and the Creation of a Pluralistic
Society
Economic liberty rests on respect for a free and open market sys-
tem.202 The courts assume that a free-market system creates good, nor-
mal, and desirable societal results. Under state constitutions, state power
was never created to undermine what is considered good, normal, and
desired. Historically, the free market existed as an underpinning of
197. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
199. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. See Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 393-94 (1963).
201. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211-12 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. See Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495,
498 (Fla. App. 1984).
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American society, and the power of law was not intended to destroy that
underpinning. Social progressives should be able to make the same argu-
ments concerning a variety of private sexuality. In a sense, the free-mar-
ket concept transcends economics and includes a variety of behaviors.
When private moral choices do not harm society, those choices should be
accorded legal legitimacy just as economic choices are. Social liberty
then protects social pluralism, which in turn encourages people to choose
a variety of ideas and behaviors. The state has no more interest in regu-
lating a social variety of choices than it does economic choices.
Social progressives still have the opportunity to utilize economic lib-
erty to preserve and expand social choices. State constitutions represent
their second chance to exploit economic liberty rather than oppose and
destroy it. Before the end of the twentieth century, American constitu-
tional law, albeit state constitutional law, could include a broad-based
protection of liberty far more secure than the narrow federal constitu-
tional privacy protections of the 1970s and 1980s. Progressives need to
recognize the importance of limiting state power and the role of the state
constitution in creating such limits.

